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UNRWA's institutional framework before and after Oslo 
  
Since 1950, the complex range of regulatory frameworks governing the everyday lives of Palestinians 
have included an international constant: the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).1 In its role as the long-term de facto governing authority for 
registered Palestinian refugees, UNRWA producted a series of normative principles that 
continuously impacted Palestinian lives. It significance in this sense has transcended the impact of 
the Oslo Accords, with the changes of the latter generally serving to highlight rather than undermine 
or shift UNRWA’s regulatory role.  
 
The normative impact of UNRWA’s work is best understood with regard to its purpose and 
function. UNRWA is a quasi-autonomous UN body, mandated by and answerable to the General 
Assembly (UNGA). It was created in December 1949, when UNGA Resolution 302(IV) established 
the Agency with a mandate to ‘carry out… direct relief and works programmes’ and provide 
assistance to refugees from Palestine.2 UNRWA began operations on 1 May 1950 in areas that 
would later come to be known as its ‘five fields’ of operation: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
(collectively known after 1967 as the ‘occupied Palestinian territories’ or OPT), as well as Syria, 
Lebanon, and Jordan. While remaining temporary, UNRWA’s mandate has been regularly renewed 
over the years, most recently until June 2020.3  
 
As an institution, UNRWA is unique. It is the only UN body mandated to serve a particular 
group of people exclusively in one region. This set-up has resulted in the Palestinians’ exclusion 
from the mandate of UNHCR, which serves all other refugees. In fact, the Palestinians are the only 
group in the world not entitled to UNHCR’s services.4 The considerable scholarly debate over how 
this exclusion disadvantages them is too extensive and complex to cover here.5 The more pertinent 
point is that UNRWA’s uniqueness created a distinctive humanitarian regime for the Palestinians, 
whereby they were governed by their own separate institution. The significance of UNRWA’s 
unique humanitarian regime is exacerbated by the fact that the vast majority of registered Palestinian 
refugees are statelesss (the exceptions being those with Jordanian citizenship).6 This has led to 
UNRWA becoming a de facto government for the refugees, its authority buttressed by its UN status.  
 
UNRWA’s quasi-governmental role is manifested in its responsibility for issuing Palestinian 
refugees with legal documents that enable them to verify their identity, establish their entitlement to 
services, work and travel - much as state-issued passports and ID cards otherwise do. For many 
decades UNRWA also issued birth certificates, annotated with the Agency’s emblem and the 
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signature of an Agency official.7 While Palestinians in the OPT have also held Israeli-issued ID cards 
since 1967, UNRWA’s documentation has continued to hold its own unassailable importance as the 
only ‘official’ evidence of one’s Palestinian identity and refugee status.8 The result is that Palestinian 
refugee identity has become inextricably tied to the international sphere and particularly the UN, by 
way of UNRWA’s hybrid nature as a ‘Palestinianised’ international organisation.  
 
The Oslo Accords had the potential to alter this situation with the creation of alternative 
national authorities in the OPT. Indeed, UNRWA’s quasi-governmental role was initially reduced so 
as to accommodate the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994. With the PA 
intended as a mechanism for Palestinian self-government in a future state, UNRWA’s remit shrunk 
amidst talk of an eventual complete handover. PA-issued passports undermined the former 
significance of UNRWA documentation; a fledgling Palestinian infrastructure meant that UNRWA 
was no longer the only ‘Palestinianised’ system in the OPT. Yet the ultimate failure of the Oslo 
process precipitated a reversal of this early trend, as the need for UNRWA’s services continued and 
in some cases increased. In particular, the Agency’s services have been paramount in Gaza since the 
beginning of the ongoing Israeli blockade in 2007.9 It can thus be argued that the Oslo Accords’ 
impact on UNRWA’s regulatory framework in the OPT was minimal in the long run, resulting in 
alterations rather than fundamental change.  
 
 The Oslo Accords also failed to eradicate the distinction between those Palestinians who are 
registered with UNRWA and those who are not – a distinction that constitutes one of the most 
important elements of the Agency’s impact on Palestinian lives. When assessing UNRWA’s 
regulatory impact, it is crucial to note that the Agency has never provided services to all Palestinians, 
or even to all Palestinian refugees - either in the OPT or elsewhere. Instead, registration is limited to 
individuals who meet its eligibility criteria as: 
 
a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the 
conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and his means of 
livelihood and took refuge in 1948 in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief, 
along with his descendants in the male line.10 
 
This criteria excludes a considerable number of Palestinians who might otherwise be considered 
refugees, including those who were working or studying abroad at any time from 1946-48, and those 
who took refuge outside of the five fields. It also reinforces a patriarchal system, whereby men can 
pass on their refugee status to their children but women cannot. 
 
UNRWA’s exclusionary criteria means that an estimated two-thirds of Palestinian refugees,11 
and just under half the global Palestinian population (including non-refugees),12 are registered with 
the Agency. While this includes around a quarter of Palestinians in the West Bank,13 in Gaza more 
than 70% of the population are eligible for UNRWA services.14 As a result, the majority of the 
Gazan population receive services from an international organisation, upon which they are often 
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dependent but which they cannot formally hold to account.15 These dynamics reinforce the impact 
of the Palestinians’ non-citizenship, as their de facto government is funded not by their taxes but by 
donations from the ‘international’ (mostly Western) community – thus undermining the Palestinians’ 
ability to formally regulate or exert pressure on the structures that govern their lives.   
 
The impact of UNRWA’s eligibility terms has also affected the internal dynamics of 
Palestinian society. The distinction between registered and unregistered Palestinians is not merely 
abstract but has direct practical consequences. UNRWA’s normative framework has created a reality 
on the ground whereby one’s refugee status - and the institutional recognition of it - becomes a 
direct determinant of one’s entitlements and conditions. Unregistered Palestinians in the OPT can 
be denied access to UNRWA’s services and welfare programmes, despite the fact that their need 
may actually be greater than that of their registered counterparts. UNRWA’s codification of formal 
refugee status has thus created an internal demarcation within Palestinian society that has sometimes 
caused considerable resentment.16 The establishment and impact of the Oslo structures have failed 
to eradicate this demarcation. However, they have created a parallel system in the form of the PA, 
whereby the distinction is not between the registered and the unregistered but between Palestinians 
in the OPT and those in the shatāt.  
 
 The Palestinian response to UNRWA’s exclusionary registration practices constitutes one of 
the most striking examples of their attempts to negotiate and even resist the normative framework 
that its work engenders. The population has long seen UNRWA’s services as a right to which they 
are entitled by virtue of being Palestinian; as such, any discrimination between different ‘categories’ 
of Palestinian refugees is unacceptable. The post-Nakba decades accordingly saw Palestinian 
communities organise regular protests against moves by UNRWA to add further restrictions to its 
eligibility criteria, or charge unregistered Palestinians for using its services.17  
 
 Again, this is one area where the impact of the Oslo Accords has arguably been minimal. In 
fact, Palestinian demand for the full provision of services from UNRWA has increased rather than 
lessened in recent years, as the Agency’s deficit has resulted in swingeing cuts to many of its 
programmes. In 2015, there were protests in camps across both the OPT and the Arab host states 
when UNRWA postponed the start of the school year due to insufficient funding.18 Many refugees 
argued that the education programme is their right as Palestinians and as such cannot be curtailed. 
More recently, the closure of an UNRWA hospital in the West Bank has led to further protests.19  
 
Service cuts have not been the only area of UNRWA’s work that has met with Palestinian 
resistance. The Agency’s political positioning has also been the source of considerable contestation. 
UNRWA’s work is ostensibly apolitical - a point continually reiterated by successive Directors and 
Commissioner-Generals.20 Yet in reality, its normative impact on Palestinian lives has been 
inseparable from the inherently political nature of their situation. Numerous Palestinian refugees, 
along with other commentators, have accordingly argued that UNRWA’s insistence on framing its 
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work in apolitical terms has actually served to marginalise the refugees’ agency.21 Some even suspect 
UNRWA of secretly being in league with their political enemies.22  
 
As a result, many Palestinian refugees have continually sought to turn UNRWA’s apolitical 
status on its head. They have frequently campaigned and petitioned the Agency to advocate for their 
rights on the world stage.23 In 1970, a group of Palestinian UNRWA employees even wrote to the 
Commissioner-General complaining about the UN’s perceived bias against the Palestinian 
nationalist struggle.24 Again, the Oslo era has changed neither these demands nor these suspicions. 
Protests in Gaza in July 2017 saw large numbers of refugees accuse UNRWA of failing to campaign 
for their rights; some even charged it with being part of the Israeli siege.25 
 
 The evidence thus suggests that the case of UNRWA ultimately demonstrates the failed 
promise of the Oslo Accords. While the impact of the latter initially resulted in the Agency re-
positioning its quasi-governmental role in the OPT, the changes have been secondary rather than 
elementary. Oslo failed to fundamentally reconfigure the key features of UNRWA’s normative 
impact, particularly in terms of its registration policy and eligibility criteria. Meanwhile Palestinian 
perceptions of the Agency, the population’s tendency to contest and resist its framework, and the 
issues that cause particular tension, have all remained constant. When it comes to UNRWA’s 
regulatory framework, the post-Oslo era has been characterised by more continuity than change. 
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